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Summary 
Over the last two decades in OECD countries increasingly more firms are certifying as Socially 
Responsible (CSR is the acronym for Corporate Social Responsibility). This kind of certification is 
assigned by private companies that guarantee that a certain firm’s behaviour is environmentally 
and sociologically correct. Some papers (including Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; McWilliams and Sieger, 2001; Ullman, 1985) tried to establish if there exists a link 
between Social Responsibility certification and the performance of firms. Their results were 
ambiguous and did not show any common connection. This ambiguity depends mainly on the 
static nature of their analyses and on the problem of whether performance is affected more by 
certification costs or by increasing sales due to an effect on reputation. Our work would like to 
discover whether certain performance indicators are affected by a firm’s social responsible 
behaviour and their certifications by looking at panel data. The novelty of our analysis is due to its 
dynamic aspect and from a CSR index that intersects two of the three main international indices 
(Domini 400 Social Index, Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, FTSE4Good Index), to be 
objective and obtain a representative sample. The main results seem to support the idea that CSR 
firms which are more virtuous, have better long run performance. They have some initial costs but 
obtain higher sales and profits due to several causes reputation effect, a reduction of long run 
costs and increased social responsible demand. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Growth 
 











Address for correspondence: 
 
Sergio Vergalli 
University of Brescia 
Via San Faustino 74/b  
25122 Brescia 
Italy  
Phone: +39 0302988810   
Fax: +39 0302988837   
E-mail: vergalli@eco.unibs.it 
   1






Over the last two decades in OECD countries increasingly more firms are certifying as Socially 
Responsible (CSR is the acronym for Corporate Social Responsibility). This kind of certification is 
assigned by private companies that guarantee that a certain firm’s behaviour is environmentally and 
sociologically correct. Some papers (including Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 
1997; McWilliams and Sieger, 2001; Ullman, 1985) tried to establish if there exists a link between 
Social Responsibility certification and the performance of firms. Their results were ambiguous and 
did not show any common connection. This ambiguity depends mainly on the static nature of their 
analyses and on the problem of whether performance is affected more by certification costs or by 
increasing sales due to an effect on reputation.  
Our work would like to discover whether certain performance indicators are affected by a firm’s 
social responsible behaviour and their certifications by looking at panel data. The novelty of our 
analysis is due to its dynamic aspect and from a CSR index that intersects two of the three main 
international indices (Domini 400 Social Index, Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, 
FTSE4Good Index), to be objective and obtain a representative sample. 
The main results seem to support the idea that CSR firms which are more virtuous, have better 
long run performance. They have some initial costs but obtain higher sales and profits due to 
several causes reputation effect, a reduction of long run costs and increased social responsible 
demand. 
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1.  Introduction 
Reality shows who firms have recently been able to adapt to a changing world not only by 
developing economically but also socially and ethically. A firm’s aim remains based on a 
development strategy that not only favours its share holders but also responds to all 
stakeholders involved either directly or indirectly in the production process.  
A firm is an open system and to carry out its main aim must be able to combine two large 
categories of interest: profitability and its stakeholders’ interest. Given that a system of 
exchange and mutual influence is created between stakeholders and the firm, management 
must be able to analyse objectives, resources and the strategy of common groups of 
stakeholders that need to be considered as well as its own ability to mobilise other 
stakeholders.  
Given their over-riding priority compared with other stakeholders, the consumer has 
assumed a focal role, which has led firms to act ethically on their behalf as part of a new 
‘social consciousness’. We can see that once the ‘primary needs’ of firms have been meet, 
advanced firms increasingly want to meet ethical values. A clear sign of this has been the 
growing number of firms that have decided to take ‘socially responsible’ action (see 
Masino and Poddi, 2008; Poddi and Vergalli, 2008). 
This is where the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has developed 
and is beginning to enter into common lexical knowledge and is increasingly being used by 
academics and economists for the sustainability of economic development. As often 
happens when new terms are coined, they tend to lose their conceptual precision, leaving 
their evocative value which is however watered down by the multitude of different 
meanings and contexts in which it is used. The concept of CSR indeed, takes on different 
meanings depending on the organisation or group that uses it. Some tend to emphasize 
individual aspects that they believe to be more important than others e.g., ethics, the 
environment, safety, education or human rights. Definitions often vary as they represent 
historical and social differences between countries. Indeed, certain definitions underline a 
particular theme because it is more relevant in that particular state, at other times the 
concept of CSR reflects the level of economic and therefore social development  of a 
country
2.  
Due to the different weight given to the term by different countries, the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD
3) has given the following definition: 
 
                                                 
2 For a more complete definition see Masino-Poddi, 2008. 
3 http://www.wbcsd.org   3
“CSR is the task of a business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working together with 
workers, their families, the local community and society in general to improve quality of life.
4”  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility has begun to be discussed in Italy only recently and in 
particular since the European Council of Lisbon (2000) included it as a fixed strategy. In 
2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper that contained its guidelines. In 
the United states, the theme has been of interest for longer. Already in the mid 70’s the 
American Securities and Exchange Commission requested by the Natural Resources Defence Council 
– introduced certain social variables in the information that a publicly quoted company 
should give to its investors and the general public. So, themes such as business ethics and 
corporate responsibility began to spread among economically developed countries. It is clear 
that this innovation caused a shake-up in the accepted aspect of firms as they introduced 
the perception that the source of success could not ignore respect for working conditions 
or other social implications.  
Recently, we have seen a growing, ‘race’ for social certification as a response to the 
changed relation between firm and consumers as witnessed by the growing number of 
CSR firms in particular in OCSE countries (Figure 1). 
Thanks to the response to the interrelationship between strategic corporate aims and 
respect for all players involved in a company, at a theoretical level the stakeholder theory 
seems to be useful to measure the social responsibility of a firm by means of social 
accountability. The novelty is in the push of firms to, ‘find business and resources opportunities 
that they would otherwise not know about
5” in respect to all the players involved directly or 
indirectly with a company’s activity. This theory underlines the fact that relations are 
fundamental for the existence of a firm and therefore should be looked at in more detail as 
they could open up new opportunities for a firm. The subjects that create this network 
include principally the community where the firm is situated, workers and customers.  
In response to consumer satisfaction and the reaction that CSR companies have had in 
developed countries we can realise that CSR certification is an evolutionary phase of 
growth and therefore needs structural and linking elements. One of the main aims of this 
work is to evaluate this concept by using econometric instruments.  
However, if we are to say that CSR is necessary for corporate strategy, given the recentness 
of the phenomena and absence of a well defined and universally accepted certification 
method, at present CSR has certain major limitations which we would like to rectify: i.e., 1) 
                                                 
4 Another interesting and complete definition of CSR is “the duty of an organisation to react to aid both its own interests and those of 
the general”. S. Ranjan Mohapatra, Programme Manager, VISION FOUNDATION 
5 Frynas, J G. (2005), “Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Analysis”, Chapter 4, Global Strategic Management.      4
certification, that is an objective benchmark rather than a mere marketing tool for the 
public, 2) the principal motivation and elements that push firms into ethical behaviour and 
suitable certification. It is actually this second point that has given rise to a proliferation of 
articles concerning social certification (including Preston e O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock e 
Graves, 1997; McWilliams e Sieger, 2001; Ullman, 1985) that have still not shed light on 
the motivation that entices firms to bear the cost of certification or looked at the 
experimental performance of CSR firms. As a result, various performance measures have 
been adopted both on the market and in accountability that all give rather discordant 
results. 
Our paper is organised as follows: paragraph 2 is devoted to explain the sample choice, 
paragraph 3 gives some descriptive results, paragraph 4 and 5 list the main variables used 
in the literature and the main results, respectively. Paragraph 6 shows the data used, in 
paragraph 7 we explain better our aim and our main results in full. Paragraph 8 looks in 
depth at some particular variables and 9 is devoted to the conclusions. 
 
2 The Sample 
To define our sample, the first problem we have faced is related to the right and true (non-
exploitation) use of social certification. Therefore, in order to obtain a good sample, we 
have crossed over various social indices. Then, we have selected the firms for our sample, 
following these steps: 
1.  We assumed that the corporate responsibility firm group includes enterprises that 
belong at least at two of the three main stock option indices of the market in 2004
6 
(i.e. Domini 400 Social Index, Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, FTSE4Good 
Index
7). In this manner, we have tried to complete the methodology used by 
Barnea and Rubin (2005) and by Waddock and Graves (1997). There are 317 
suitable firms obtained; 
2.  In the second step, we defined the control sample of 100 units, containing non-
CSR enterprises in order to be homogeneous for the sectors with the CSR sample. 
The choice of the firms has been done randomly for each economic sector. This 
part was made by using the Dow Jones Global Index;  
3.  Finally, the total sample included 417 firms in 2004. In order to have the time 
series of our database, we started with the 2004 sample, and maintaining the total 
                                                 
6 In this sense we took the most famous and recognizable indices at an international level. The choice of  year (2004) was 
due to our need to include the highest number of firms in our sample, given the novelty of this peculiar economic 
phenomenon. 
7 For the stock market analysis, we referred to the following webpage: http://www.sustainable-investment.org/.   5
number of firms we worked backward until 1999, changing the non-CSR/CSR 
ratio. I.e. we started from the 2004 sample and we created a dummy variable for 
each year from 2004 to 1999, imposing the number 1 if that firm was certified as 
CSR company in that year and zero otherwise, by using the intersection (for a 
couple of sets) of the three indices
8. We were not able to work further back than 
1999 because there was not a sufficient number of CSR firms in our database. 
After building our database in this way (see the appendix) we downloaded the 
balance sheets of all 417 firms, using Perfect Analysis software
9. 
 
3.  Descriptive analysis 
By using the methodology described above, figures 1 and 2 show the number of CSR firms 
and their growth rate, respectively, for the period between 1999 and 2003. As we can see, 
the number of CSR firms rose with increased growth rates. For simplicity we grouped all 
the firms in 5 groups as follows: USA (USA), Japan (Jap), Rest of the World
10 (Others), 
Europe (EU)
11 - and World (Total). From the two figures it is possible to underline that: 
-  The number of CSR enterprises has increased considerably, showing that “Corporate 
Social Responsibility” is a very interesting phenomenon and therefore must be analysed. 
-  As far as the geographical composition is concerned, it is possible to observe that the 
highest number of CSR enterprises are from the United States and European Union, i.e., 
two of the most developed areas. From this first rough observation, we can begin to 
consider that growth is a crucial variable for the development of ethical conscience, and 
therefore the CSR. 
- Figure 2 sheds light on two further important aspects: 
-  The growing number of CSR enterprises does not seem to be “time-dependent”, but it 
progresses with jumps that could depend on economic development; 
Although the EU has fewer enterprises, than the USA, its growth rate is higher than the 
USA, which possibly depends on a catch-up phenomenon. It is also important to stress, 
that the growth rate of the number of CSR enterprises has decreased since 2002. Does 
social certification depend on economic trend? Why does this reduction not affect some 
                                                 
8 For the FTSE index we referred to the website:  
http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/htmle/assessment/review2003.html; for the Domini Social Index the data refer 
to the Domini 400 SocialSM Index (DS 400 Index). 
9 Perfect Analysis contains the panel data of the stock prices, the level of dividends, and also other financial information 
about firms’ balance, exchange rates, and markets indices. Moreover, it contains the main OECD economic indicators. 
10 With the word “Others” we do not consider the sum of residuary countries of the world, rather, the number of 
countries that do not belong to the other three groups (i.e., the USA; Jap, and EU) but that belong to our CSR database. 
In detail, “Others” includes: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand. 
11 We have considered Europe in a geographical and not political sense. This means that the EU includes the following 
countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Low 
Countries, Belgium.   6
countries that depend on the US economy, like the EU and Japan? Our possible 
conjectures were as follows: 
a)  The USA are the first subjected to crisis
12, while other countries, even if they are linked 
to the US economy, have a delayed reaction. This could explain why the EU growth rate 
only slightly retracted in 2002, followed by a big decrease in 2003; 
b)  the number (flow) of enterprises strongly depends on the total number of firms that 
are CSR (stock). This means that if there is a lot of CSR firms, the probability that new 
enterprises are certified as CSR is low and also the ratio between the number of new 
enterprises and the total is low. Nevertheless, even if this explanation is plausible and 
verifiable when we are near the saturation point, this is extremely unlikely to be near also 
because the phenomenon is very recent. Moreover, this explanation does not explain the 
2003 recovery. 
c)  the financial crisis in the US (i.e., the Enron case
13 and Worldcom), probably reduced 
the credibility of some enterprises, changing the management priority and probably 
increasing certification control of CSR firms, thus delaying the certification of new 
enterprises. 
 


















                                                 
12 It is useful to remember that 11th of September 2001, considerably affected the US economy at the end of 2001 and at 
the beginning of 2002. 
13 16 January 2002.   7





















4.  Literature: Performance Measures 
According to the research aim, there are many measures that are useful to verify 
performance. Both accounting and market variables can be considered. 
 
4.1. Accounting measures 
ROE  (Return on Equity) (1999-2003) is used a great deal in economic literature 
(Bowman and Haire, 1975; Bregdon and Marlin, 1972; Perket and Eilbirt, 1975; Spicer, 
1978; Preston, 1978; Cowen et al., 1987; Waddock and Graves , 1996, 1997; Preston and 
O’Bannon, 1997). ROE is equal to a fiscal year's net income (after preferred stock 
dividends but before common stock dividends) divided by total equity (excluding preferred 
shares), expressed as a percentage. It measures the rate of return on ownership interest 
(shareholders' equity) of common stock owners. It measures a firm's efficiency at 
generating profits from every dollar/euro of net assets (assets minus liabilities), and shows 
how well a company uses investment dollars/euros to generate earnings growth. 
 
ROA (Return on Assets) (1999-2003).  ROA percentage shows how profitable a 
company's assets are in generating revenue. It is given by the ratio between net income and 
total assets. This ratio tells us "what the company can do with what it's got", i.e., how 
many dollars/euros of earnings they derive from each dollar/euro of assets they control. It 
is a useful number for comparing competing companies in the same industry. The number   8
will vary widely across different industries. Return on assets gives an indication of the 
capital intensity of a company, which will depend on the industrial sector. Companies that 
require large initial investments will generally have lower returns on assets. This parameter 
is widely used in the literature, i.e., Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985), Belkaoui and 
Karpik (1989), Waddock and Graves (1997), Preston O’ Bannon (1997), McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001)  Luce, Barber and Hillman (2001). 
 
ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) (1999-2003) is used in finance as a measure of 
the returns that a company is making from capital employed. It is commonly used as a 
measure for comparing the performance between businesses and for assessing whether a 
business generates enough returns to pay for its cost of capital. It is given by the ratio 
between the pre-tax operative profit and the capital employed. As far as we know this 
indicator is used by Preston and O’Bannon (1997).  
 
4.2. Market measures 
MKTCAP (Market Capitalization). Also in this case, the MKTCAP is widely used in 
economic literature: Moskowitz (1972); Vance (1975); Alexander and Buchholz (1978); 
Belkaoui and Karpik (1989); Patten (1990); Wright and Ferris (1997). It is a measurement 
of corporate or economic size equal to the share price times the number of outstanding 
shares  of a public company. That is, it is the value of a firm as related by the stock market 
value multiplied for the total number of market shares. 
Beta. The beta coefficient, in terms of finance and investing, describes how the expected 
return of a stock or portfolio is correlated to the return of the financial market as a whole. 
That is, it shows the volatility of a stock on the stock market. A beta coefficient greater 
that 1 means that the security is aggressive and tends to amplify the stock market 
movements, and therefore it has a higher risk, a beta lower than 1 shows a defensive 
security. It has been used by Alexander and Buchholz (1978), Chen and Metcalf (1980) and 
by Spicer (1978). 
 
4.3. Mixed Measures 
MVA (Market Value Added) (1999-2003). This is the difference between the current 
market value of a firm and the capital contributed by investors, as it is possible to find in 
the account books – in this sense it is a mixed measure since it merges account and market 
values. If MVA is positive, the firm has added value. If it is negative, the firm has   9
destroyed value. This measure has been used by Simerly and Li (2000), Cochran and Wood 
(1984).  
 
4.4 Other Main Characteristics 
Many studies about the relationship between CSR and performance have focused their 
attention on a variety of other important characteristics that can be possible causes of a 
firm’s performance. Some research has studied the effect of a firm’s size, industrial sector, 
age, leverage level and intangible expenditure. 
 
4.4.1 Dimension 
According to Waddock and Graves (1997), it is possible to assume that the biggest firms 
are able to behave more responsibly than the smallest ones. The biggest ones probably pay 
more attention to their relationships with external stakeholders. Moreover, Orlitzky (2001) 
confirms that a firm’s size affects the link between certification and performance: at the 
beginning the firm’s strategies are focused on basic survival and only when the firm is 
increasing its dimension because it has crossed the trigger point of survival, can it begin to 
take care of ethical and philanthropic responsibilities. In the meantime the firm’s size can 
be linked with financial performance through economies of scale. 
In the literature, a firm size has been measured by using the number of employees, total 
asset value or the total sales. Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) use the natural logarithm of the 
sales net value, while Trotman and Bradley (1981) use both the sales value and the total 
asset. Cowen et al. (1987) and Patten (1991) use also the Fortune 500 index and the natural 
logarithm of sales. But all these measures are quite similar and strongly correlated, as 
stressed by Kimberly (1976). 
 
4.4.2 Industrial Sector 
The industrial sector could strongly affect the social certification. Dierkes and Preston 
(1997) affirm that the firms whose economic activities are able to modify environment and 
the firms working in natural resources (mining, forestry, oil, gas, and so on) are more 
controlled in their environmental performance than other sectors. Moreover some 
enterprises that have a strong relation with consumers need to show clean social 
behaviour, so that this affects the firm’s reputation and so its sales (Cowen et. al., 1987). 
Furthermore, Patten (1991) stresses that the industrial sector (as a proxy of dimension) 
affects policy fame of a firm and therefore this fact forces the management to take public 
opinion into account (Belkououi, Karpik, 1989). Indeed the industrial sector affects the   10
number of enterprises belonging to the CSR group: sectors with high capital intensity have 
a lower number of firms than the low- labour intensity sector (i.e. banks, financial services, 
etc. )
14.   
 
4.4.3 Age of Capital 
Another variable that could potentially affect social certification is the ‘Capital Age’ of a 
firm. Roberts (1992) assumes that the higher the historical involvement of an enterprise in 
social investment, the greater the induced reputation and higher the stakeholders’ 
expectations and therefore profits. Cochran and Wood (1984) the capital age was 
measured as gross and net capital: if this index tends towards 1, then the firm is relatively 
young. The result is that capital age is negatively correlated with the CSR variable. This 
means that the younger the enterprise, the higher the ethical investment. Indeed, new firms 
do not have transformation costs for new lines of production and it is more expensive to 
change a firm’s structure than to create a new one. 
 
4.4.4 Intangible Assets Expenses 
The economic literature is focused strongly on R&D expense, but our comments on this 
variable are quite similar to total expense (also considering costs related to the CSR index). 
Indeed, R&D is a subset of total intangible assets and could also be used as a proxy 
variable of intangible assets. McWilliams and Siegler (2000) found that the R&D variable is 
positively correlated with the CSR index and financial performance. This can be explained 
because R&D expenses and innovation is one of the main variables that can affect 
economic growth in the medium-long run. Moreover, R&D expenses are sometimes 
assumed as a proxy for social certification. 
 
4.4.5 Leverage 
Leverage is given by the ratio between total debt and shares. Myers (1977), Wallace et al. 
(1994) have found a positive relation between the leverage variable and CSR index
15. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) supported this result, by explaining that a firm tends to 
increase its social information in order to reduce rising monitoring costs from high 
leverage. The same explanation is given by Ahmed and  Curtis (1999), who stress that the 
higher the bonds percentage on the balance sheet compared to the share percentage, 
                                                 
14 About this, see Waddock and Graves, 1999. 
15 In this approach, CSR index is defined by social disclosure, that is social information.   11
(interest rate is less risky than shares), then the greater the social information and social 
certification. 
Roberts (1992) tested the following hypothesis: the higher a firm’s leverage, the higher 
creditors’ expectations. Unfortunately he found no empirical results. Negative correlations 
were obtained by Belkaoui e Karpik (1989). 
 
  4.4.6 Risk 
Much research has studied whether there is a relation between market risk and social 
responsibility, defined by social disclosure.  
The economic literature shows that firms with high systemic risk use social certification in 
order to reduce their risk, and then their beta coefficient (Trotman and Bradley, 1981; 
Roberts, 1992). Richardson et al. (1999) and Botosan (1997) show that increased social 
information can reduce asymmetric information and so the cost of capital (and therefore 
total costs), by reducing risk. 
 
5.  Literature: empirical analyses 
Empirical research on the link between CSR and financial performance has given a lot of 
varied and heterogeneous results. In particular, there is a great variety in the sign of the 
relation studied (appendix 1, table 17).  
 
  5.1  Negative relation 
Waddock and Graves, (1997): assumed that companies with responsible behaviour may 
have a competitive disadvantage, since they have unnecessary costs. These costs, fall 
directly on the bottom line and would necessarily reduce shareholder profits and wealth 
(Preston and O'Bannon, 1997). 
Both short-term analysis based on measuring abnormal returns (Wright and Ferris, 1997) 
market measures (Vance, 1975) and long-term studies (Vance, 1975) have a negative 
relationship between performance and CSR. 
 
5.2 Neutral relation 
Waddock e Graves, (1997): their explanation of a neutral relation suggest that many 
variables in the relation between social and financial performance make the connection  
coincidental.   12
McWilliams e Sieger, (2001): one explanation  of this could be that firms supplying CSR 
products to their own customers have a different demand curve compared to those with 
no CSR. 
Ullman (1985) underlines that no clear tendency can be recorded between connections on 
social information, social performance and economic results. The main reasons for this is 
the theory’s inadequacy, inappropriate keyword definitions and lack of empirical material. 
The author observes that important aspects are not just social performance and economic 
but also “information” about social performance and that only a few studies have analyzed 
this three-dimensional relation.  
Other studies highlight the impossibility of defining the sign of the existing relation 
between CSR and performance, both in the short term – on the basis of Abnormal return 
measure (Welch e Wazzan, 1999) and market actions -  and in the long term  (Aupperle, 
Carroll e Hatfield, 1985)
16. 
 
5.3  Positive relation 
Waddock e Graves, (1997) outline three explanations for a positive relation between CSR 
and financial performance:  
a) Valuating what would happen if an enterprise did not act in a responsible manner. If it 
tried to reduce its implicit costs acting in irresponsibly, the result may be an increase of 
explicit costs from forcing a inefficient condition. The final result would be a competitive 
disadvantage. An example would be the case of atmospheric pollution that leads to a 
lawsuit.  
b) Responsible social practices are the same as “good management”.  They strengthen 
relations with stakeholders and at the same time improve overall performance. 
c)  The third explanation follows the “theory of scarce resources” and identifies the 
adoption of responsible social behaviour as a consequence and not a cause of performance 
improvement. The idea is that during a positive trend there will probably be fewer limited 
resources. Some of these resources could be liberated in secondary activity such as CSR. 
Preston e O’Bannon, (1997): made use of a similar hypothesis called “available funds”, as a 
firm’s behaviour depends on accessible resources. The authors present an alternative 
theory to “good management” called “the hypothesis of social impact”: i.e., better financial 
performance follows a stronger company reputation. By considering stakeholders’ implicit 
needs, a company increases its reputation which improves financial performance. On the 
                                                 
16 There is no positive correlation between CSR and financial economic results, also after a correction about the riskiness.   13
other hand, failing to answer stakeholders’ needs creates market uncertainty, raises the risk 
reward paid to investors and increases costs and possible losses.  
A less obvious explanation for a positive relation could be that CSR enterprises are more 
attractive to workers. In the information age, good employees are an extremely desirable 
resource and it is crucial to more appeal for them. 
Luce, Barber e Hillman, (2001): studied the relation between CSR enterprise appeal to 
employees and a firm’s public profile. They claim that a firm’s reputation has a positive 
influence on the relation between CSR and appeal.  
Short term studies based on abnormal return measure (Posnikoff, 1997) and on market 
actions (Moskowitz, 1972) showed a positive relation between performance and CSR.   
Moskowitz (1972) noticed that the average of “common stock” returns of 14 selected 
ethical enterprises for the first half of 1972 was 7,28%,  an amount that was higher than 
the Dow Jones’s industrial index. 
Over the long term, Cochran e Wood (1984) showed a positive relation between social 
responsibility and financial-economic valuation (after controlling for the age of the 
company). Furthermore, Waddock e Graves (1997) found a significant positive relation 
between CSP index and performance measure as the ROA. 
 
6 Data  
Referring to paragraph 4 and using the Perfect Analysis database, the following 
performance variables were collected for 417 enterprises: 
 
6.1  Accounting measures 
ROE (Return on Equity) (1999-2003): this variable is fundamental as it defines 
economic performance - as highlighted in sub-4.1.  
ROCE (Return on capital Employed) (1999-2003): it was decided to adopt ROCE as a 
variant of the more common ROA, due to the greater compatibility of data.  
 
6.2. Market  measures 
MKTCAP (market capitalization). Data derived from Perfect Analysis, in the budget 
reports of each company – “Fundamentals” sheet; voice “Market Cap”.  
Finally, it was decided to look at a mixed measure: firstly because it is more objective as it 
takes data relating to the market and also to complete the measure. 
 
   14
6.3. Mixed  measures 
MVA (Market Value Added) (1999-2003). This measure identifies the “reputation” of 
business activity as the stakeholders’ response to different company activity. This 
performance indicator was made using Perfect Analysis data with the following 
methodology: the company’s market share value was estimated referring to July 2004 and 
multiplied by the number of shares at the closing share price on December 31st of each 
year (from 1999 to 2003). The Yahoo Finance website was the source for historical stock 
prices. The "stockholder's equity” is then subtracted from the equity market value in the 
social balance sheet of each company. So we can compare the economic value of 
stakeholders’ equity (MV) and its book value, and then the market (and therefore 
stakeholders) can evaluate the business in place or in the future.  
 
6.4  Other Variables 
Each company is different from another in how it implements CSR. Differences depend 
on many factors such as for example, the enterprise’s size, the particular sector in which it 
operates, the corporate culture, stakeholders’ demand and historically how progressive the 
company is in achieving CSR.  
Some companies specialize in a single area, which they consider the most important or 
where they have the greatest impact or vulnerability (human rights, for example, or the 
environment), while others want to integrate CSR into all aspects of their operations.  
Other variables that influence CSR choice are as follows: 
AGE (1999-2003) is the ratio between the net value and gross assets in property, buildings 
and equipment. The more this ratio tends to a value of one, the newer the company is. 
Data source: Perfect Analysis- "Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Gross)" and 
"Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Net)".
17  
INTA (Intangible Asset) (1999-2003) annual expenditure on intangible heritage, namely 
copyrights, patents, intellectual property and know-how. Intangible spending pushes 
performance and and can easily be used as an instrumental variable to be a CSR firm or 
not, is strongly correlated. Source: Perfect Analysis,  -"Intangible Assets - Total." 
STLT (Short Term Debt / Long Term Debt) (1999-2003) is the ratio between short-
term/long term debt. Considering the important role of indebtedness, we wanted to 
discern its type. Data source: Perfect Analysis - "Common Size "ST Debt (% of Assets)" 
and "LT Debt (% of Assets)." 
                                                 
17 The expectation against the use of this variable is defined as: "The latest companies behave more responsibly" 
(Cochran & Wood, 84).   15
Intensity (intensity of work) (1999-2003): ratio between number of employees’ and total 
assets. In the Perfect Analysis database -  "profits and losses", - data were collected on the 
number of employees under the heading "Employees Units”. For total assets: balance 
sheet "total- assets ". 
Size (1999-2003). Total sales has been used to define a company’s size, as illustrated by 
Stanwick (1998), based on the work of Fonbrun and Stanley (1990) and Cowen et al. 
(1987), referred to in paragraph 4.4.1.  
Risk. On the relation between belonging to a CSR group and risk, it was pointed out in 
paragraph 4.4.6. how it can be quantified through the Beta index. The beta index was 
obtained for each 417 companies of the sample, compared to 2004. However, it was not 
possible to obtain the historical series of this index to compare time to those used in the 
panel analysis.  Therefore only cross section analysis was possible. A useful caveat 
regarding our future analysis is that the possible reduction of company risk is closely linked 
to economic management. Socially responsible behaviour aims at reducing environmental 
organizational and operational risk. Nothing is said about financial risk, even if it adopts 
the Beta index to quantify risk. This discrepancy creates different results and comments on 
risk assessment. For detail, see the technical part of this work. 
Reputation. We use a reputation quotient published over the last six years by the 
Reputation Institute
18, based on a survey on the more visible American multinationals. In 
details, each company was assessed by over eighteen random factors selected by the 
company’s policy. The respondents associated a score based on 20 attributes relating to six 
key dimensions: a) Products and services; b) Financial performance; c) Work environment; 
d) CSR; e) Vision and leadership; f) Emotional appeal. 
The index is explained for a sample of firms from 1999 to 2004 (see appendix). 
Critical Demand (1999-2003). The literature justifies a sales’ increase from a 
differentiation on the market offer. The critical consumers satisfy their needs with peculiar 
goods characterized by environmental respect or improvement of labour conditions.  Data 
on critical questions are taken from a research carried out by MORI (Market and Opinion 
Research International)
19.  
Social  Capital (1999-2003). To replace the concept that an individual’s choice (and 
therefore  total demand) has changed due to critical behaviour we looked at data on social 
capital indicators. In recent literature, the social capital concept has evolved from initially 
purely sociological definitions (Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1990) to include broader 
                                                 
18 Reputation Institute - www.reputationinstitute.com  -  www.harrisinteractive.com 
19 MORI (Market and Opinion Research International) – www.mori.com   16
meanings including civic sense (Putnam, 1993, 1995), cooperation between individuals and 
'compliance with the law (Fukuyama, 1995, Guiso et al., 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000). So, social capital could be considered a proxy of individual behaviour and, 
therefore, could be considered a useful variable. The data on social capital were obtained 
from IVIE (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas) database
20. 
GDP (1999 - 2003): data from the World Bank database.  
 
7 Empirical Analysis 
7.1 NPC Test: Stratigraphical Analysis 
In order to obtain our first results, that can support the hypotheses we have explained in 
the previous part, we start with a stratigraphical analysis by using the NPC test software
21.  
 
7.1.1 CSR vs. non CSR 
The first step is to compare CSR and no-CSR enterprises. Table 1 shows if the variable in 
the line is statistically greater for the CSR firms than for the no-CSR firms.  
            Table  1: Stratigraphical Analysis 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

























ROE  - NCSR<CSR 
** 
- - - 
In detail, we compare different variables such as MVA, SIZE, INTANGIBLE and ROE 
in pairs of two groups (CSR, non CSR, USA and EU, HIGH and LOW) and the nil 
hypothesis that a variable of the first group is on average greater (or lower) than the 
variable of the other groups is tested. The asterisks show the significance level to accept 
the nil hypothesis ( * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%). The dash signifies that the two 
groups are not statistically different. 
Moreover: 
- CSR-MVA is greater than non-CSR-MVA in years 2000, 2001, 2003 at the significance 
level of 99% and in 1999 and 2002 at 95%; 
- the CSR firm dimension (SIZE) is greater than non-CSR for all years (95% in 1999 and 
2000 and 99% in the others); 
                                                 
20 Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas - www.ivie.es 
21 NPC Test is able to do non-parametric tests to verify hypotheses. In general some parametric methods are used to 
verify hypotheses like normality of a distribution, that are hard to check. Instead, by using non-parametric methods, we 
compare different data permutations, and we test the nil hypothesis that the distribution, independently by his shape, is 
the same in the two groups.    17
- intangible expenses are statistically greater in the CSR group than non-CSR in 1999 and 
2001. However, the two groups are not significantly different in other years; 
- in 2000 the ROE variable is significantly greater in the CSR group. 
By cross section analysis, we understand that CSR-MVA is greater than non-CSR. 
Nevertheless, this study is unable to indicate the gap level between the two groups and it 
tells us nothing about gap variability (how does it change over time? Does it increase or 
decrease?) In order to study this variability, we use average MVA for the two groups, 
obtaining the following table 2. 
 
       Table 2: comparison between CSR and NCSR 
Average levels  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
MVA CSR  36968.92 25363.29 20231.74 12324.95 16655.41 
MVA NCSR  19901.77 14064.49 8881.49 7147.39 9199.32 
GAP  17067.15 11298.79 11350.25 5177.55 7456.09 
 
The results are: 
- MVA of the two groups decrease until 2002 and rose in 2003; 
- the MVA gap reduce until 2002 and increase again in 2003 ; 
Given that the MVA of both groups moves in a common path, they probably have a 
common variable. This may be the economic trend, defined in our work by the Dow Jones 
Global Index. Indeed, if there is an economic crisis, it is probable that MVA decreases, 
ceteris paribus. Therefore, it is useful to make a comparison with the Dow Jones Global 
Index and MVA values, in figure 3. 
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Comments about figure 3: 
•  MVA and DJ have a common path; 
•  MVA of CSR group is higher than non-CSR group, as we have seen previously. This is 
a consequence of a) a foresight in a uncertain context (investors bet on CSR enterprises, 
causing an increase in CSR shares); b) an increase in the firm’s value (investors include a 
perfect evaluation of the firm in their investment decision); 
•  both groups have a higher evaluation than DJ. Since all firms belonging to our sample 
have a higher MVA and since the non-CSR group was built trying to maintain the same 
homogeneous sector structure as the CSR group, our conjecture is that the firms that want 
to become CSR have a high MVA. This implies a distortion in our sample. So, in 
conclusion, the gap between non-CSR MVA and DJ comes from the self-selection of 
enterprises in the CSR group. The gap between the CSR and non-CSR group is due to the 
CSR choice. 
The CSR firms were larger than the non-CSR group over the entire period. Size levels were 
calculated by using sales values. Therefore, the result could depend on the greater financial 
resources owned by big enterprises with greater volume of sales (Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Orlitzky, 2000). 
The final result was that we observe higher expenses in intangible capital in CSR firms. 
This result is quite common in economic theory (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000): intangible 
capital also includes social expenses and also points to greater attention to social 
investment. 
 
7.1.2 The USA vs. EU 
We also extende our analysis to compare European (EU) firms and American (USA) ones, 
table 3. 
                   Table 3: focus non EU and US firms 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 




- - - 








INTANGIBLE  EU<USA 
** 
- - - - 
ROE  - - -  EU<USA 
* 
- 
ROCE  EU<USA 
** 
- - - - 
AGE  - - - -  EU>USA 
*** 
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Comments on table 3: 
- in 1999 the number of European CSR firms was significantly lower than in the United 
States. This has changed since 2001, as we can see from the growth rate of CSR firms in 
the EU and USA  (see figure 3).  
- Since 2000, Market Value Added was significantly lower for EU enterprises. This was 
also supported by ROE and ROCE values. Our explanation is that MVA value probably 
include the market value of a firm. In particular, the greater its value, the greater are 
expectations of economic growth, i.e., GDP growth rate. For this, the expectation in US 
firms’ growth was higher than European firms, due to a more optimistic forecast for US 
growth. In conclusion, this could explain why US MVA is higher that the European one. 
 
7.1.3 High vs. Low profile 
The next comparison is made between industrial High o Low Profiles,: 
HIGH: according to Roberts (1992), industrial sectors defined as “high profile” are these 
well-known by customers to have high political risk, e.g., high competition, such as oil, 
chemical, mining, forest, paper, cars, aeroplanes, energy, transport, tourism, agriculture, 
tobacco, alcohol, communication and media. 
LOW:  in this group we have the financial sector including food, health, hotel, 
construction, electrical equipments, textile, clothing, retailing, medical provision, real 
estate. In the literature, it is assumed that industrial sector characteristics can affect 
corporate social choice therefore social performance.  
For example, different industrial sectors can face different risks. Fombrun and Shanley 
(1990) found a strong correlation between risk and stakeholder assessment. Moreover, 
other important sector features (such as dynamism, etc.) are considered key factors of 
social performance.  
 
Table 4: HIGH-LOW profile  
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
CSR  - - - - - 








ROCE  HIGH<LOW 
*** 
- - - - 






















  HIGH>LOW 
*** 
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Looking at table 4, we can see: 
- there is no statistical difference between HI and LOW profiles for social certification 
(CSR) or ROE; 
- MVA is considerably higher between 2000 and 2003 for LOW profile; 
- ROCE is higher in LOW profile, only for 1999; 
- intangible expenses are higher in HIGH profile companies (since 2000 until 2003); 
- LOW profile firms are younger than HIGH profile companies; 
 - the short term debt over long term debt ratio is higher in LOW profile companies in 
1999 and 2001, but is lower in 2003.  
- the difference between HIGH and LOW profile, according to the CSR index is not 
significant. This is due to the methodology we adopted to define the CSR sample and the 
control sample, which by definition had to be equivalent. However, by working backward 
the two different databases are not statistically different; 
- for MVA values, the HIGH profile group is more volatile, which would imply that 
stakeholders believe that their shares are more risky. This could explain a relatively worse 
performance evaluation than for LOW profile companies. Furthermore, there are always 
more CSR firms in the LOW profile. Therefore, if a CRS firm has a high MVA level , this 
indicates that there are more CSR firms in a particular group thus increasing the MVA 
average for that group.  
For this reason, given that there are more CSR enterprises in the LOW profile
22, a question 
arises, why is there this disproportionate spread between the two groups? Is there a sector 
that encourages firms to be CSR? From table 4.1, we can see that the financial sector in the 
LOW group, has the highest percentage of CSR enterprises
23. This could be explained as 
due to fact the social certification entails high costs (changing corporate organization, 
plant, labour relations and so on). It is probable that financial firms have lower costs for 
certification. 
Moreover, we can comment the other variables in the following manner: 
-  the results on ROCE variable are not sufficient to comment on. 
- the high level of intangible capital expenses in the HIGH profile is an expected result, 
because this group includes firms with high technology that are highly motivated to spend 
                                                 
22   Table 5: Number of CSR for each group 
  CSR Non  CSR 
  HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
1999  41 125 75 176 
2000  46 145 70 156 
2001  58 177 58 124 
2002  70 201 46 100 
2003  77 221 39  80 
 
23 The sector called “discretionary consumption” is equably distributed in High and Low group.   21
on Research and Development. The LOW profile on the other hand, is characterized by 
“traditional sectors” with low levels of innovation. 
- as far as AGE is concerned, the results show that LOW profile enterprises are the most 
recent. This could be explained by underlining that the HIGH profile enterprises are 
generally oligopolistic companies, characterized by few new enterprises. 
- finally, as far as the DEBT variable is concerned, we are unable to comment given the 
ambiguous results.  
 
7.1.4. In details: USA vs. EU 
Studying our results in depth and by focussing on membership, we find the following: 
 
                  Table 6: US Stratigraphical Analysis 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ROE  NCSR>CSR 
**     
NCSR<CSR 
** 
MVA    
NCSR<CSR 
**    
AGE  NCSR<CSR 
** 
NCSR<CSR 
**   
NCSR<CSR 
**   
 
 
                Table 7: EU Stratigraphical Analysis 
 
      1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

























AGE  -  NCSR>CSR 
** 
- - - 








Concerning tables 6 and 7, we makee the following comments: 
1)  MVA: 
-    there is no univocal statistical result concerning the relation between profitability and 
CSR variable for the US. This could depend on a high US MVA independent of qualitative 
features. We can see that MVA volatility is higher in CSR enterprises than in the control. 
We can also see that during a negative period, CSR-MVA tends to drop sharply, 
converging towards the non-CSR level. In 2001, the US had a short-term peak followed by 
reduced growth  (figure 3), of CSR enterprises on the Dow Jones. Here, the MVA level of   22
CSR enterprises may converge smoothly towards non-CSR values. However, it was in any 
case higher than in the European market.  
The lack of an univocal statistical result could mean weak public support of a firm’s critical 
behaviour. Critical demand in US is not binding and investment choice to become CSR 
has different rationale (trying to forestall critical growth or adapting investment choice to 
other markets). 
-  For the EU, there is strong evidence that the MVA-CSR relationship is positive. About 
the reason for this we must bear in mind that critical demand is more developed in the EU 
than in the US, as underlined in MORI (Market and Opinion Research International) and 
this can also be supported by the political approach of the EU and US to environmental 
problems (e.g., the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol). Moreover, we can see that the US 
crisis affected the EU market only weakly. Indeed, the EU had reduced growth rates and 
also from specific causes. So, a weak shock implied a lower MVA reduction. CSR firms 
therefore maintain a higher level of MVA. 
2)  AGE: 
For the USA, the AGE variable seems to support Cochran and Wood (1984). This index is 
higher for CSR firms which means they are more recent. We believe that the more recent a 
firm is, the lower the costs are to change labour organization or to invest in innovation. 
However, the EU results are less clear as the link between CSR and AGE is not statistically 
significant. 
 
7.1.5. In detail: HIGH vs. LOW 
The last analysis concerns the comparison between CSR and non-CSR firms in different 
HIGH and LOW industrial profiles:  
 
       Table 8: LOW Profile Stratigraphical Analysis 
  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 


























                Table 9: HIGH Profile Stratigraphical Analysis 
  1999 2000  2001  2002  2003 





***  -  - 
As far as the LOW profile is concerned, we obtain the following:   23
-  on average MVA is higher in the CSR group for all five years; 
-  the size of non-CSR enterprises is lower for 4 (from 2001 until 2003) out of 5 years; 
-  CSR expenses in intangibles are higher between 1999 to 2001 and are not significant 
for 2002 and 2003. 
Concerning the HIGH profile, the only significant variable is the expense in intangibles, 
which is higher for the CSR group. These results can be explained as follows: 
-  again it is possible to confirm that CSR_MVA is higher than for non-CSR enterprises, 
and statistically relevant only for less volatile LOW profile,. 
-  CSR are bigger, which could depend on the higher resource level of CSR firms. The 
difference between LOW and HIGH could depend on a minimum critical dimension of a 
LOW profile enterprise.  For HIGH profiles, the firms are obliged to obtain independent 
certification , if this is part of the firm’s ex-ante investment strategy.  
-  Finally, in both cases, expenses in intangibles is higher for CSR firms. Indeed, Research 
and Development are considered intangibles and e.g., could be useful to improve “green 
technology”. R&D variable is often used as a proxy of the CSR index. 
 
7.2    Correlations among variables 
In table 10, we show the correlations between variables for 2001, the most representative 
year
24. Here, we comment on our main results
25. 
 
  Table 10: Correlations26. 
Correlation  2001 CSR MVA ROE  SIZE AGE  INTA  INTENSITY  STLT GDP 
CSR  1              
MVA  0.1691 
***  1            
ROE  0.0017 0.0712  1             
SIZE  0.1375 
*** 
0.4034 
***  -0.0580 1          
AGE  0.0327 0.0692 0.0066 0.0473  1        
INTA  0.1186 
**  0.0028 -0.0707  0.2522 
*** 
0.1689 
***  1      
INTENSITY  -
0.0195  -0.0718  0.2343 
*** 
- 0.0968 
*  - 0.0662  - 0.0865 
*  1    
STLT  0.0325  0.0593  - 0.0059 - 0.0336 - 0.0492  - 0.0426  0.0171  1   
GDP  0.0400 0.0734 -  0.0108 0.0393 -  0.1208  -  0.0289 0.0132 -  0.0111  1 
                                                 
24 For other correlations, see Poddi, L. (2005).  
25 In this respect we will comment on the main relations for the entire period.  
26 Our first consideration is that the correlation coefficient (r of Pearson) is low in all cases. Therefore, even if there is a 
significant correlation, it is weak. This implies that it does not totally explain our phenomenon. We need a formal model in 
regression. This could solve the multi-collinearity problem among variables in the model we will show look at.   24
Lat us observe table 10: 
- MVA is positively correlated with CSR variable and dimension (SIZE); 
- SIZE is positively correlated with expenses in intangibles, that is the INTA variable; 
- CSR is strongly correlated to dimension and intangibles; 
- And intangibles are positively correlated with AGE. 
We can see that MVA seems to be linked with the CSR index, while the bigger the firm’s 
size, the higher its value. Given that SIZE took account of total sales and given that more 
business meant better performance for investors, then the MVA-SIZE relation is in line 
with our results. The most recent firms spend more in intangibles, due to the start-up 
procedure of a firm that includes copyright, R&D and innovation technology costs. 
 
7.3 The Regression Model  
The dependent variable of our first model is called Π (i.e., profit or economic 
performance) and it can be defined either using the MVA variable (sometimes preferable 
because it takes into account not only accounting data but also market evaluation), or the 
ROE or ROCE. The independent variables are CSR and SIZE, according to the following 
scheme: 
it it it SIZE CSR 2 1 0 β β β + + = Π  
where the subscripts i and t follow the statistical units (firms) over time. 
The next step should be a 5 years cross-section analysis to verify magnitude and sign. 
Here, there might be an endogenous problem related to CSR and performance variables. 
This is due to the following syllogism: the best performing firms with the best 
performance may be interested to enter the social index for their highly available resources. 
Vice versa, a CSR firm with a high reputation could improve its market evaluation. So, 
before running our regression, we need to understand if there is endogeneity among 
variables and which is the direction of the  CSR ⇔ Π  relation. To do this we have used 
Granger test and the Hausman test. While the first one shows that CSR causes MVA, the 
results of the second show 4 of 5 cases with no endogenous problem
27.  
                                                 
27 The results of this test are in table 11. 
                 Table 11: Hausman test 
  Endogenous Exogenous 
1999   X 
2000   X 
2001  X  
2002   X 
2003   X   25
Nevertheless, to be sure of avoiding this problem, we have used the IV method.  
 
7.4 Panel Data 
The panel analysis is more useful to study longitudinal samples in a continuous framework. 
We have used STATA software to estimate our model. Given that endogeneity is assumed 
between MVA and CSR index in the literature, we have used the instrumental variable 
(IVs) method. To do this, we have used the variables INTANGIBLE e AGE that are 
correlated with the dependent variable MVA but that are not correlated with the 
independent variable CSR, that we have assumed as an endogenous variable.  
 
7.5 MVA Analysis 
Here, we show the main results: 
Table 13: Regressions: MVA dependent variable 
(*) 90% significant; (**) 95% significant; (***) 99% significant;  
 
Where: 
2 R 28=  adjusted  
2 R ; CSR = dummy variable that assumes a value 1 if the firm belongs at least to two of the 
indices adopted; SIZE = variable that assumes 1 for small enterprises, 2 for medium enterprises and 3 for the biggest 
ones according to the amount of sales; GDPPRO = GDP per capita of the country of a firm; GDPPRO_1 = GDP per 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
28 It is important to stress that panel regressions have a very low 
2 R . This is due to the inter-temporal interpolation of 
data. Indeed, the panel is a merge of cross analysis with a historical series. Its explanatory function is between the two 
methods. The difference compared with historical series is that there is a difference between individuals. For this we 
should see a 
2 R  that is quite similar to the cross section’s one. For this, we must calculate the 
2 R  using the 



























Intercept  - 1306658 
(- 2.13)** 
- 1557901 
(- 2.27)**   
-1370819   
(- 2.35)** 
 - 418917.8 
(- 1.36)   
39154.62     
(1.75)* 
- 914084.7    
(- 1.78)* 
CSR  - 325748.2 
(- 2.51)** 
- 345438 
(- 2.59)**   
- 328930.9   
(- 2.70)*** 
- 348862.7    
(- 2.55)** 
- 341819.9    
(-2.59)*** 
- 323266.9   
(- 2.17)** 
SIZE  32029.9 
(1.58)    
50274.22   
(2.01)**   
43326.09 
(2.00)** 
42977.74   
(1.90)* 
43637.06    
(1.95)* 
28508.12   
(1.41) 
GDPPRO  47.64 
(2.20)**    
54.53    
(2.32)** 
49.02 
(2.41)**   
15.83    
(1.48) 
  
GDPPRO_1        33.68       
(1.86)* 
INTENSITY    327.2976   
(0.44) 
    
STLT   0.0004 
(1.76)*    
0.0004 
(1.79)*    
0.0004 
(1.70)**   
0.0004 
(1.68)*    
0.0004 
(1.65)*    
DEMAND      2.44e-07     
(2.01)** 
3.12e-07    
(2.30)** 
1.53e-07   
(1.74)* 
2 R   0.78 0.7167  0.7197 0.7249  0.7248 0.8581   26
capita with a year of lag; INTENSITY = labour intensity calculated as the ratio between the number of employees over 
the total asset; STLT = is the ratio between short-term debt and long-term debt; DEMAND = is the critical demand in 
UK, used as a proxy of ethical consumption in OECD. 
 
Model 1 
The first model is the following: 
it it it GDPPRO * 47.64     CSR * 325748.2   -   1306658 -     MVA + =      (1) 
The result of our first regression shows that: 
“MVA decreases when CSR increases” 
Our explanation follows these steps: 
-  We should remember that CSR is a dummy and assumes a value of 1 when a firm 
belongs to the CSR sample. This implies that model 1 studies how much the MVA 
average changes when a firm starts to belong to the CSR group. From figure 3 and tables 
3 and 4 we know that a CSR firm has a higher MVA, hence we would expect a positive 
relationship between MVA and CSR. But we must pay attention to the comparison 
between figure 1 and 3. MVA is higher for CSR firms, but the interpolation analysis does 
not distinguish between the two groups (CSR and non-CSR), but evaluates the average 
level of MVA. The result is that over time, MVA reduces but the number of CSR firms 
increases. This explains why the sign between the two variables is negative. Further close 
examination stresses that the sample is a finite number so when CSR increases, non-CSR 
decreases. For this the coefficient shows how much MVA changes depending on the 
variation of CSR percentage in the sample. Therefore, more CSR enterprises means that 
some enterprises have changed their group in the sample. These firms come from the 
no-CSR group with a low MVA level and go to the CSR group with high MVA, reducing 
the average MVA. 
The second main result from model 1, is that MVA increases with the rise of GDP per 
capita. This is not surprising because when GDP increases there are more resources useful 
for further investment. 
The variable SIZE is not shown because it is not significant. This variable seems to show 
contradictory results. We could say that it is not so obvious that a higher amount of sales 
implies better market evaluation, especially during unfavourable situations. 
Model 2a 
The regression of the 2nd model is as follows: 
it it it it it   STLT   *   0.0005     GDPPRO   *   54.53     SIZE   *   50274.22     CSR   *   345438   -   1557901   -     MVA + + + =       (2)   27
This model varies as it introduces the STLT and INTENSITY variables. In this case, 
variables SIZE and STLT are significant. Concerning the signs of CSR and GDPPRO, see 
the explanations given for model 1. A positive STLT sign means that the short and long 
term debt ratio tends towards a higher percentage of short term debt. The investors prefer 
to buy shares because they expect an increase in profits in the long run. 
Finally, variable INTENSITY is not significant and this could mean that the CSR index is 
not affected by variables related to the firms’ structure and organization. Indeed, we 




The model is: 
it
it it it it
  STLT   *   0.0004
    GDPPRO   *   49.02     SIZE   *   43326.09     CSR   *   328930.9    1370819   -     MVA
+
+ + + =
    (3) 
Model  3a 
The model is:  
t
  it it it it
DEMAND   *   07 - 2.44e  
STLT   *   0.0004     GDPPRO   *   15.83     SIZE   *   42977.74     CSR   *   348862.7   -     MVA
+
+ + + + = it     (4) 
Our first comment stresses that MVA is not only a premium of a firms’ strategies but it 
could also represent, if there is perfect asset evaluation, firm’s profit. On the one hand, 
increased GDP per capita means higher consumption and therefore higher sales, on the 
other hand, higher wealth does not necessarily mean more expense on ethical products.  
In order to understand how product differentiation of CSR firms affects Π, we must 
include another variable: critical demand. This variable is closely related to GDP per capita 
because, as we have seen in figure 1, CSR firms are concentrated in the most developed 
countries. This implies that critical behaviour and therefore critical demand tend to rise in 
OECD countries. To confirm this, we have used a causality test, showing that GDP per 
capita Î DEMAND. After our digression, model 3° clearly shows non significant GDP 
per capita, because its effect is caught by DEMAND. R
2 value and the significance of 
DEMAND seem to support our model, even if the constant is not significant.  From this 
we obtain the following model 3b. 
Model 3b 
  DEMAND   *   07 - 1.53e
    STLT   *   0.0004     SIZE   *   43637.06     CSR   *   341819.9    39154   -     MVA
t
it it it it
+
+ + + =
  (5) 
                                                 
29 Without the variable INTENSITY (not significant) the regression was confirmed and the 
2 R  was greater.   28
R
2  value and the significance of all coefficients show that the model is our best one. 
Nevertheless, a high GDP pro capita implies a development of a critical demand and 
therefore lagged GDP per capita could affect MVA, as shown in model 4: 
Model 4 
t
it it it it
DEMAND   *   07 - 1.53e  
  STLT   *   0.0004     GDPPRO_1   *   33.68     CSR   *   323266.9    914084.7   -     MVA
+
+ + + =    (6) 
SIZE is not significant. 
In all cases SIZE does not show clear and univocal results. 
For the last three models (3a, 3b e 4) we have developed an analysis that includes a critical 
demand weighted for each country’s consumption level. Obviously, this must be strongly 
correlated with GDP per capita (0,9), as consumption level is one of the main components 
of the GDP. But constructing this variable could be an extreme synthesis of the critical 
behaviour of consumers, including two variables affecting MVA, i.e., a higher GDP per 
capita is generally linked with increased DJ and high critical demand pushes investors 
towards CSR enterprises as they wait for long-term profits. Nevertheless, there are two 
weak aspects which have made us use other variables: a) on the one hand, it is weighted to 
UK critical demand (we have no other reports about critical demand); b) on the other 
hand, we have distinguished these two aspects by adopting the following variables: 
1.  GDP per capita as a proxy of critical behaviour and economic trend; 
2.  Demand: a variable that tries to trace the linear trend of critical demand. The idea 
consists in assuming that critical demand trend follows the same trend in different 
countries. This is because a ethical behaviour starts after a trigger wealth point is reached 
and therefore, after a common threshold point for homogeneous countries in GDP. By 
adopting this variable, we have tried to distinguish between GDP per capita and critical 
behaviour.  
We tested the absence of a multi-collinearity among regressors, by using the diagnostic 
VIF
30. In our case, the VIF value is 1.07, and therefore there is no multi-collinearity 
problem. 
8 Close Examinations 
8.1 CSR and Beta 
In order to verify the link between CSR and a firm’s risk, we divided the distribution of the 
whole sample (417 firms) into quartiles, by using the Beta level of 2004. The first quartile 
contains 25% of observations belonging to the interval [-0.02; 0.68] in which less risky 
                                                 
30 VIF means “Variance Improvement Factors”. If VIF is high we have a multi-collinear problem.   29
firms are gathered that have a beta level lower than the benchmark case (market level equal 
to 1) and have low volatility. The last quartile includes the more risky firms
31. 
In the following table (table 14) we have the number of CSR and non-CSR enterprises, 
belonging to the first and fourth quartile, i.e., the less (Nrisk) and the most risky (Risk), for 
the years between 1999 and 2004
32. 
 
Table 14: number of CSR and non-CSR enterprises, belonging 
to the first and fourth quartile 
CSR 1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 TOT 
Nrisk  34 37 46 59 65 71 112 
Risk 42 48 62 71 78 82 102 
NCSR 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 TOT 
Nrisk  78 75 66 53 47 41 112 
Risk  60 54 40 31 24 20 102 
 
The analysis is on the static relation between variables, focussing on the number of 
enterprises belonging to different groups
33. 
Our findings are as follows: 
a)  The total number of Nrisk is higher than risky firms. However, we can stress that the 
number of CSR firms is higher in the Risk case (and a higher percentage). This implies that 
there is a high share of risky CSR firms. This is an odd result. Indeed, McGuire, Sundgren 
and Schneeweis (1988), Trotman and Bradley, (1981); Roberts, (1992), found that “risky 
firms use CSR to reduce their risk” and therefore our expectation is that we should find a low 
number of CSR firms in the risky group.  Concerning this: 
1)   a beta higher than 1 could mean a high positive volatility of shares as a consequence 
of economic shock; 
2)   if we assume a perfect market, this implies that the investors perfectly foresaw the 
asset value and the riskiness of the investment, then we need to study in depth the total 
distribution of enterprises with respect to the beta index (figure 4): 
i)  given that there is a positive (right) asymmetry of distribution, we have a higher 
number of non-risky enterprises; 
ii)  However, since the average beta is higher than 1, then, according to point a), that 
there are some very risky firms in our sample (whose beta level is high enough to move the 
                                                 
31 It is useful to stress that the Beta index is a market share index that considers  speculative risk. It could be assumed as 
an index of working risk under the assumption of perfect markets. 
32 It is worth nothing that nothing can be said about the dynamic impact of the certification on risk: indeed we have only the beta 
index of the year 2004. 
33 Our implicit assumption is that we maintain fixed the intervals.   30
distribution to the right) certified as CSR (i.e., outlier cases). In this context, the strategic 
choice of the management could have been to become CSR in order to reduce riskiness (as 
assumed by Jenkins and Newell), but the effect is a medium-long run effect and we must 
wait to find their results. The crucial finding is in the year taken into account and in the 
period in which the virtuous behaviour started. Therefore, our results do not contradict 
the economic literature, but stress that we need to focus analysis on investment timing and 
on a firms’ heterogeneity to understand the link between CSR and risk. In conclusion, the 
high number of CSR firms in the fourth quartile stresses that the risky firms probably want 
to become more responsible. We must wait for the medium-long term to find the effects 
of social responsible behaviour.  
 
        Figure 4: total distribution of enterprises with  

























               Table. 15: Descriptive statistics 
Average  1.0299 
Median  0.9900 
First quartine  0.7900 
Second quartile  0.9900 
Third quartile  1.2925 
Minimum  0.09 
Maximum  0.7900 
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8.2 A comparison between MVA, Beta e CSR 
 
Comparing the average MVA level among risky and non-risky firms in table 16 and in 
figure 5, we find that a firm with high volatility in its shares has a higher profitability both 
in CSR and non-CSR cases. 
   Table 16: MVA comparison level among risky and non-risky firms 
  MVA99 MVA00 MVA01 MVA02 MVA03 
RISK_CSR  52317.99 36532.09 22342.89 10617.67 18110.22 
RISK_NCSR  52459.61 33152.37 21955.76 10624.4 19247.68 
NRISK_CSR  13332.24 12214.53 11418.76 9182.31 11134.10 
NRISK_NCSR  10839.88 10740.26 10322.76 8972.41 10848.98 
 
 

























From table 2 and figure 3, we can see that MVA_CSR is higher than MVA non-CSR, but 
from figure 5 we can see that in the last quartile there are quite similar values. How can we 
explain that MVA_CSR is equal to non-CSR? Comparing this result with table 16, we find 
that the highest difference of MVA values is in the middle of the distribution. The only 
explanation maybe is the short term effect of CSR investment. If, as we have observed, the 
adoption of virtuous behaviour is a management choice to reduce long-run riskiness, the 
fourth quartile may consist of firms that have been recently certified CSR. Therefore, there 
is no difference between CSR and non-CSR firms. The only difference is a formal 
certification that needs time to act.  
Moreover, we need to stress that if the fourth quartile were composed of a normal 
Gaussian distribution of new and old CSR firms (therefore, distribution according to the 
age of CSR enterprises), then we will have virtuous and non-virtuous effects that could 
counterbalance each other. On the one hand, short-run certification could reduce the   32
MVA level, because the firm must pay to become CSR. On the other hand the possibility 
to reduce risk and improve performance, could increase the MVA level
34.  
The two effects combine, and so CSR values equal the non-CSR ones. As far as the central 
quartiles are concerned, we must say something different. A higher MVA level for CSR 
may be due to the age of the firms. In this case they could have “metabolized” the 
investors’ premium that is a lower volatility and a higher MVA
35.  
Finally, the addition of beta variable entails a change in stock perception: 
a) if the firm is non-risky, it is better to be CSR; 
b) for risky firms, it is indifferent . 
 
8.3 Industrial sectors 
Regarding the role-related industries, we can assume that this is an important element to 
analyse CSR companies. A company, to be certified as CSR, has to support costs on the 
adoption of "virtuous" behaviour in the organisational structure of the company, both for 
ethical and negative environmental externalities and also reduce detrimental action of 
ethical principles. Therefore we can consider that it is more difficult to certify companies 
as CSR that by their nature are more involved in potentially harmful activities, such as oil 
companies. At the same time, some companies are aided in this as they in no way reduce 
the company’s profitability e.g., banks.  
So, we can compare sectors in our sample, in order to discern the sector impact of CSR. 
However, it is difficult to see significant peculiarities in the two groups, as the control 
sample was specifically homogeneous for the industrial sector. That is to say that there is 
an implicit difference between the two groups, for sector composition. Therefore, results 
derive from our descriptive analysis (see Poddi, 2005; paragraph 4.1.2). 
 
8.4 Reputation 
In the literature, it seems that the concept of reputation is of fundamental importance for 
the effects of CSR. The basic concept consists in considering reputation as a consequence 
and synthesis of a strategic choice of business (Cowen et. Others, 1987; Roberts, 1992; 
Preston and O'Bannon, 1997). The decision to become CSR is perceived by consumers 
and by investors as a sign of possible future performance. We have also seen that investors 
do not reward this choice with a higher average MVA . Therefore, given the importance of 
this variable, we have tried to implement it into our model.  
                                                 
34 Belonging to the fourth quartile could be due to short adoption timing or a specific risk. 
35 In order to distinguish the age of CSR firms, we need more data for more year.   33
The only parameter that we found in the literature is the Reputation Institute, shown in 
paragraph 6.4. At least theoretically, there is a strong link between CSR and the Reputation 
Index, because the CSR variable is one of its fundamental elements. However according to 
empirical evidence, the reputation index is not significant, highlighting either errors of its 
empirical model or a combination of internal weights. 
It should be noted that another key variable in building the reputation quotient is financial 
performance. In order to find why it is not significant, we projected data relating to 
reputation and financial data. Figure 6 shows the average values of Reputation Index (also 
showed in table 18) and the MVA for the companies we have data, to show that the 
reputation index is almost completely weighed on financial variables. 
 










































8.5 Social Capital 
We have made an additional profit analysis using social capital in a country as explanatory 
variables. This measure reflects the number of donations and associations within the 
community and should provide a degree of altruism in that area. The most interesting 
result is that by inserting SIZE, GDPGRO, DEMAND and Social Capital (SC) as 
regressor delayed by one year, we get a significant and positive coefficient for capital. This 
seems to indicate that the company expects a development period to see how consumers 
react against social exclusion. Based on this trend, the company creates a product, which 
generates demand for critical consumption. 
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9 Conclusion 
Our work has tried to verify, whether certain performance indicators can be affected by a 
firm’s social responsible behaviour and their certifications. The novelty of our analysis 
comes from its dynamic aspect and from the building of a CSR index that intersects two of 
the three main international indices (Domini 400 Social Index, Dow Jones Sustainability 
World Index, FTSE4Good Index), for an objective and a representative sample. We have 
analysed some simple descriptive statistics and we have used cross section and panel data 
econometrical approaches, to verify whether social certification could affect a firm’s profit.  
 
The multitude of approaches are here the scope of analysis that we believe necessary given 
the complexity of this issue.  
A first simple approach gives us some interesting results concerning aspects which to our 
knowledge have not been treated in the literature. Indeed, results of our first statistical 
study have shown the considerable growth of CSR firms over the last ten years that are not 
uniformly distributed in all countries of the world. Indeed, there is a certain asymmetry of 
this phenomena. Initially, there would seem that this asymmetry is due to the link between 
CSR firms and economic development. Intuition would tell us that only when there is a 
determined level of economic development pro capita will the so called ‘critical sense’ of 
an individual develop. This intuition is underlined by the fact that CSR firms have 
increased substantially almost exclusively in Europe and the United States. 
The second result of our descriptive analyses shows that this relation has a delay period as 
long as certain independent factors influence the dependent factors. This is not surprising 
as it is reasonably logical that the perception of a certain ‘status’ can only occur with a 
temporal lag and that this can in turn be explained by dependent variables.   
The following observations have shown that there is a difference in the development of 
CSR in two principal geographical areas: on one hand the US have more CSR firms while 
Europe has a higher growth rate of CSR firms that would point to a convergence of the 
two areas. The following stage is the research for a clear reply to our main question; what 
relation exists between performance and CSR? As performance yardstick we have used 
what would appear to be the most complete measure in the literature given that it is a 
solution to the slowness of accounting measures and the subjectivity of investors to 
market measures. Due to the lack in the literature of not only a single definition of the 
performance-CSR relation but also to its cause, we have used a specific analytical statistic 
to determine the sign of this relation. From the data we have gathered, it would seem that 
there is a clear positive relation; i.e., CSR influences performance.    35
During the calculation of this analysis, we used NPC software that can make layered 
studies by comparing certain groups to the variables we wan to look at (MVA, CSR, ROE, 
ROCE, INTA, AGE, etc). These groups have been defined on a geographical basis, from 
a low to high industrial profile and to whether the firms belong to the group of CSR firms. 
The principal findings are that MVA is on average higher in the CSR group than in non-
CSR firms. We also found that CSR certified firms have increased (and therefore there is 
an increase in firms with a low average MVA in the CSR group, thus lowering the average 
MVA in this group). This result would seem to support what we have stated in the 
descriptive analysis.   
Subsequently we have presented and interpreted the correlation between all these variables. 
In particular, we have concentrated on MVA as a performance variable, comparing it with 
two other typical variables ROE and ROCE. Regression was carried out on a data panel 
and also using the instrumental variable method to eliminate any possible objection to the 
link between performance and CSR.  
The principle result is that MVA decreases with the increase of CSR, which seems to 
contradict the previous result where MVA is higher in CSR firms. In reality, the increase in 
the temporal series of CSR firms reduces the number of non-CSR firms: this migration 
shifts low MVA (non CSR firms) into the CSR group thus reducing the average value of 
the latter. This process explains the relative negative sign of the regression. Other results 
of the panel analysis underline that, using MVA as a performance variable, the focal point 
is the evaluation of the value of the firm by the investors, so an increase in MVA 
underlines that they are ‘backing’ a determined firm. 
In this regard, we have reflected on whether the market is indeed perfect: if the market is 
perfect or at least from the CSR point of view, then investors should be able to perfectly 
evaluate the value of a firm and so an increase in MVA would generate an instantaneous 
improvement in the performance of a firm. If this is not the case however, then investors 
would invest in the future possibility of a particular firm’s structure. In this case the 
analysis would go from being short term to medium-long term.  
Subsequently, we looked in more detail into industrial sectors and certain variables linked 
to CSR such as the risk level of a share, corporate reputation and social capital in the 
reference country.  
For industrial sectors, no econometric analysis can be used, given that the control sample 
was made up on an ad hoc basis so as to keep the sector composition of the CSR sample. 
However, it would seem from the descriptive analysis that the financial sector (banking,   36
insurance etc.) is that with the highest rate of CSR, given that costs for CSR certification 
are lower. 
For the risk factor analysis, our results do not disprove the literature but they do underline 
that it is necessary to concentrate on timing and the heterogeneity of a firm to be able to 
understand the link between risk and CSR. Indeed, we cannot clearly say that the strategic 
choice of becoming a CSR firm reduces risk. Therefore, it would seem necessary to plan 
the medium-long term before being able to see the effect of certification on the market.  
An interesting development of the analysis could be to compare MVA with a Tobin study, 
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Appendix 
Table 17: The sign of the relationship between CSR and Performance in economic literature 
Paper Variables  Sample and 
Method  RESULTS 
Moskowitz , 
1972 
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Vance, 1975  Shares 
1972-75 
























   Table 18: Reputation Indices 
Company Country REP99 REP00 REP01 REP02 REP03  REP04 
Johnson & Johnson  USA  83.4 81.6 82.5 82.1 79.47 79.81 
3M USA      80.2 78.2 76.67  79.07 
Coca Cola  USA  81.6 80.9 80.8 79 77.95  78.90 
Procter&Gamble USA      76.6 76.7 76.48  78.26 
United Parcel Service (UPS)  USA      76.6 78.7 78.49  78.24 
Microsoft USA  77.9   81.8 76.8 77.86 78.00 
Sony USA  77.4 80.5 79.4 77.5 75.81 77.95 
Intel Co.  USA  81 79.9 80.8 74.6 74.86  76.10 
Dell Computer Co.  USA      77.1 78.2 76.04  76.00 
Eastman Kodak Co.  USA        78.5 75.84   
Toyota Motor Co.  USA      75.6 72.9 74.01  75.59 
Home Depot  USA    80 75.6 78.2 75.78 74.77 
Walt Disney  USA      78 76.2 77.95  74.03 
Target USA      75.1 73 72.09  73.25 
Hewlett-Packard/Compaq USA  81.2 80.6 79.2 73.2 72.95 73.16 
Unilever USA      68.8 68.9 65.9  72.55 
Pfizer USA      73   71.34  70.97 
Nike USA      71.6 69.6 69.81  70.57 
Wal-Mart Stores  USA     76.3 75.2 72.87  70.56 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co.  USA     72.1 71 71.58   
Sears, Roebuck and Co.  USA     68.5 70.9 68.5  70.06 
General Motors  USA      73.6 69.4 66.97  68.18 
Verizon Communications  USA       65.8 65.55  67.71 
Penney J. C.  USA        69.3 68.41  67.56 
Ford motor Co.  USA      63.9 63.9 66.03  65.64 
SBC Communications    USA        62.4 65.24  65.05 
Citigroup USA      69.3 63.3   64.10 
AOL Time Warner    USA      64.5 59.4 57.25  63.89 
Bank of America    USA      60.2   63.43  63.56 
At&T USA  75.7   65.2 65.2 61.83 60.23 
Altria  Group,  Inc.  USA       53.49  60.58 
Sprint   USA      65.3 57.7 59.58  59.63 
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